

HEADQUARTERS 306TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP  
Office of the Intelligence Officer  
United States Forces

APO 557  
21 June, 1944

SUBJECT: Intelligence Narrative  
Mission: BERLIN

TO : Commanding Officer, 306th Bombardment Group (H)

1. Narrative

306th flew 40th "A" CBW complete. Assembly was good and the course was roughly as briefed. Lead group bombed at 1021 hours, on a heading of 281 degrees, at 27,000 feet. Left Cromer at 0647 hours, made control point at 5442N x 0735E at 0837 hours going in and at 5432N x 0753E at 1138 hours, coming out. Reached Gt. Yarmouth at 1303½ hours, Base at 1340 hours.

Low Group bombed at 1022½ hours on a heading of 250 degrees, at 26,000 feet. Crossed German Coast out at 5410N x 0849E at 1130 hours, reached Cromer at 1308 hours.

High Group bombed at 1024 hours on a heading of 276 degrees, at 28,000 feet. Crossed German Coast at 5418N x 0834E reached Cromer at 1302 hours.

2. Fighter Opposition and Fighter Support

One attack on a straggler from this group by 2 S/E Fighters, from 6 o'clock high shortly before target at 1018 hours. One of these attackers was shot down. In the Hamburg area on the way out, a straggler from another group was reported under attack by a pair of S/E enemy fighters when P-38's drove them away. We claim 1-0-0-0.

P-51's appeared just after the enemy coast on the way in, and were overlapped by P-38's before the target, the latter taking the formation back over enemy coast without a gap and furnishing cover for stragglers. One Me 109 was reported shot down over the target by P-38's.

3. A.A. Gun Fire

A.A. Gun Fire at Berlin was intense - both barrage and tracking. The tracking A.A. was accurate, especially after bombs away. Damage to our A/C (16 serious 10 slight) might have been much worse except for the screening effect of dense, persistent con-trails over the Target area. A.A. Gun Fire also observed at Hamburg, Kiel, Lubeck, Rendsburg and Pasewalk.

4. Bombing

The 306th group was the 8th CBW to bomb. The leader started a visual run on the Target. A few minutes before bombs away, formation ran into contrails, broke into clear, and then hit solid dense contrails, forcing formation on instruments for 5 minutes after bombs away. Low and High Groups both interfered with by other formations breaking out of contrails. Pictures locate some hits East of Templehoff Airdrome.

5. Nickels

A/C 726-0, pilot Couris, dropped 10 G-44's over Berlin.

6. Weather

10/10ths. over North Sea broke to generally clear over Continent. A bank of contrails from groups ahead lay across bomb run in an arc which stretched

North East. Immediately after target 4/10ths. clouds from 27,000 to 28,000 combined with more contrails to make dense screen which broke up group formation on way out.

7. Observations

A/C #558-W took photos with K-20 of landing strip in woods at 5315 N x 1112 E.

35 to 40 A/C reported on A/D at Nordholtz.

New construction on A/D with one completed runway and two partially completed runways at 5345N x 0954E.

About 15 S/E and 20 T/E A/C reported on Schwedt A/D.

About 18 A/C, possibly JU 88's on Hagenow A/D.

8. Aircraft Returning Early

A/C 737-U, pilot Berner, turned back at 0859 hours over Neunaunster with all four superchargers out. At 5432N x 0858E, through hole in clouds observed bridge from mainland to Nordstrand Island. Made run with bomb sight. Dropped 2 x M17's and 8 x 500 (delayed fuses). Results unobserved because of cloud cover. Landed at 1148 hours.

A/C 418-J, pilot Weiland, turned back at 0526 hours over Podington. Mechanical failure. Brought back 2 x M17's and 8 x 500.

A/C 198-D, pilot Arrison, turned back at 0750 hours at 5355N x 0439E. Failure of superchargers. Brought back 2 x M17's and 8 x 500.

9. Aircraft In Distress

A/C 368-O, pilot Rehn reported observing 2 dinghies with approximately one full crew at 5225N x 0150E at 1258 hours. Our A/C at 300 feet altitude. Information telephoned to Division.

1014 hours B-17 in flames at 5222N x 1412E from CBW behind. B-17 broke in two parts. No chutes seen.

1024 hours B-17 in spin over Berlin. 4 to 5 chutes seen, group ahead.

1035 hours B-17 on fire in steep glide. 7 chutes observed.

1100 hours B-17 down over Kiel - exploded. No chutes.

1001 hours 2 P-38's dropped 2 objects like small chutes, possible gas tanks.

JOHN A. BAIRNSFATHER,  
Major, AC,  
Group S-2.

SECRET

HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH AIR FORCE  
AAF STATION 101  
AF 634

21st June, 1944. 6

**SUBJECT:** Preliminary Report on G.A.F. Reaction to Attacks on Berlin, Ruhland and Crossbow Targets.

**TO:** Commanding General.

1. Great interest was shown this morning by the enemy in our a/c attacking targets in Berlin and at Ruhland. Plots were passed in R/T and W/T on the bombers and fighters starting shortly after our a/c had left the English Coast. Fewer plots on the "Atlantic" Force were passed than on the others, until after the latter had left the Berlin area. From then on the enemy turned his attention to the B-17's still proceeding eastwards, plotting them as far as Brest Litovsk. This flight, continuing east, after the other bombers had begun to withdraw, appears to have puzzled him somewhat, and in spite of the fact that Ruhland had been attacked between 1030 and 1039, he suggested that Breslau might be the target. Some unidentified a/c, ordered to readiness at 1120, were presumably a preparation to oppose the withdrawal of this force. There are also indications that they were later sent to Koenigsberg/Neumark and Juterbog.

2. It seems probable that a position in the Magdeburg area was again used as an assembly point by e/a. These a/s, both t/e and s/e, probably from 1, 2, and 7JD's, then proceeded to the Berlin area where vigorous attacks were made on some of the bombers, although no heavy opposition is reported by the fighter escort.

3. A/c of 2JD were heard between 0635 and 0752 travelling from Eabjerg to a position 48 miles N.W. Leipzig. Whether they ever reached this point is not known as 2JD control closed down when they were in the Hannover area, and no further R/T was intercepted. The only evidence of 7JD a/c coming into the picture comes from the 354 Group who were in combat in the Juterbog area with 15 plus e/a which approached from the South. Possibly these were on their way to the R/V point when they were bounced by our fighters.

4. There is slight indication of a secondary assembly point being used, probably in the Murtz See area. Aircraft, both t/e and s/e, presumably from the Neuruppin-Koenigsberg/Neumark area, used this before attacking in the Neubrandenburg area.

5. The few e/a encountered by the bombers and fighters on withdrawal were within a fifty miles radius of Berlin, and were possibly e/a returning to their home bases.

6. There was no reaction to the afternoon attacks on Crossbow targets in the Pas de Calais.

*Per* *AW Reswold*  
A. W. VANAMAN,  
Brig, General, USA.  
AC of S, A-3.

cc: AC of S, A-3.  
C.O.P.C.

SECRET



369th

Lt. Ethan Allen  
Lt. Clifford Baxter  
Lt. Francis Bennett 42-102975  
Lt. Lowell Burgess  
Lt. James Corcoran  
Lt. James Edeler  
Lt. John G. Davis  
Lt. Walter Gribovicz 42-107086  
F/O Andrew Kata 42-102669  
Lt. Eldon Ralstin 42-87896  
Lt. Morris Reed  
Lt. Earl Saunders  
Lt. Alfred Switzer  
Lt. Richard Vogel

423rd

Lt. George Berner  
Lt. George Broz  
Lt. William Fortson  
Lt. Harold Fossum  
Lt. Robert Horn  
Lt. Harold Miller  
Lt. William Neddo  
Lt. Donald Plecher  
Lt. John J. O'Brien  
Lt. John Winward

21 June 1944 - BERLIN

Very few records now exist in National Archives for this mission. The records appearing are taken from other sources, and do not include the crew interrogation reports. We have been able to locate a portion of the Mission Loading Lists, and to assemble a list of pilots from other sources.

367th

Lt. Milton M. Adam	43-37600
Lt. William Allen	
Lt. Harold Barrett	
Lt. W. Bradley Butterfield	
Lt. Joseph Couris	
Lt. George Mapes	
Lt. Talmadge McDonough	
Lt. Williams McNeil	
Lt. Perry Raster	
Lt. Daniel Speelman	
Lt. Charles Tell	
Lt. Charles Wegener	
Lt. William Wood	

368th

Maj. Maurice Salada	
Capt. Albert Rehn	42-97368
Lt. Dean Allen	42-38148
Lt. John J. Allen	
Lt. Gwynn Boswell	42-38155
Lt. William Breslin	
Lt. Henry Dryar	
Lt. Wayne Erwin	42-37836
Lt. Henry Hutsell	
Lt. William Nash	42-31690
Lt. Charles Niblack	
Lt. Elton Rabe	
Lt. William Reece	
Lt. Edward Patton	43-37575
Lt. Charles Trigg	44-6087

Report on Aerial Gunfire  
306th Bomb Group (H)

1. TARGET... **BERLIN** .....

DATE OF MISSION. **21 June, 1944.**

2. ROUTE AS FLOWN: - 5418N x 0840E, 5408N x 0928E, 5338N x 1050E, 5303N x 1420E, 5234N x 1423E, Target, 5312N, x 1248E, 5341N x 1031E, 5408N x 0928E, 5418N x 0840E.

3. Weather Conditions (a) At Target. **Clear.**  
(b) En Route. **Overcast as far as Hamburg then clear.**

4. Were our <sup>A/C</sup> "Seen" or "Unseen" Targets? (a) At Target. **seen** (b) En Route.....

Any Condensation Trails? **Dense persistent condensation trails over target caused our formation to break up.**

5. Description of Flak at Target, including METHOD OF FIRE CONTROL, if possible. = **Intense barrage and accurate tracking mostly from the west and center of city. Some white bursts high above formation at 30 to 35,000 feet. Most accurate immediately after bombs away.**

6. Flak encountered or observed en route. (In the order experienced if possible)

Rendsburg - Barrage obs.  
Kiel - Barrage obs.  
Neumunster - Barrage obs.  
Lubeck - Barrage obs.  
Politz - obs.  
Stettin - obs.  
Pasewalk - obs.

Brandenburg - Tracking obs.  
Schwerin - Barrage obs.  
Hamburg - obs.  
Heligoland - obs.

7. Was CHAFF carried? Was it used as briefed, if not how was it used? Observation of crews.

Chaff as briefed: **Carpet (High 7 A/C.  
Low 12 A/C.**

8. Position of Group and Combat Wing. **40th "A" CGW.**

9. Details:-

Group	No. of A/C over E/Territory	A/C hit by Flak	Lost to Flak	T.O.T.	Height	Axis of Attack	Hcmb run
Lead	18 inc. 1 PFF		0	1021	27,000	281	45 sec.
Low	16		0	1022	26,000	250	45 sec.
High	13		0	1021	28,000	270	ω sec.
TOTALS	50 inc. 1 PFF		0				

10. OBSERVATIONS: **Smoke screens obs. at Swinemunde, Stettin, Ahlbeck, and Politz. Balloon barrage at Eckernforde.**

1ST BOMBARDMENT DIVISION  
For Mission of 21 June 1944  
Berlin

The 1st Bombardment Division was made up of Combat Wings in the following order of flight:

94th "A" Combat Wing  
1st "A" Combat Wing  
1st "B" Combat Wing  
94th "B" Combat Wing  
41st "A" Combat Wing  
41st "B" Combat Wing  
41st "C" Combat Wing  
40th "A" Combat Wing  
40th "B" Combat Wing.

The 351st group supplied the lead and low boxes of the 94th "A" Combat Wing. This group encountered no E/A opposition, although the crews reported that Combat Wings following their formation were attacked by approximately twenty-five to forty S/E and T/E E/A. These attacks occurred between the I.P. and the target. From 15 to 20 S/E E/A were seen at 0915 hours near Muritz Lake.

The 401st group supplied the high box of the 94th "A" Combat Wing, and they report no E/A opposition.

The 381st group supplied the lead and high boxes of the 1st "A" Combat Wing, and the 91st group supplied the low box. Crews of the 381st group report from 75 to 80 E/A attacked in the vicinity of 5330N-1240E at 0925 hours, and these attacks lasted until 1002 hours, when the I.P. was reached (5237N-1410E). The E/A were broken down into 12 to 15 Me 109s, five to six FW 190s, ten Ju 88s, and the remainder Me 210s and 410s. From three to five minutes after the fighter escort left this group formation, the E/A were sighted flying in a group similar to our Combat Wing formation, with S/E E/A marking our fighter escort. Some E/A were seen flying in the opposite direction from 11 o'clock to 6 o'clock, stacked above the level of our A/C. Upon reaching the rear of our Combat Wing, the enemy pilots made a 180° turn and changed over to battle formation with good coordination. During this period and while the T/E E/A were queuing up 10 to 15 in line abreast level and above our formation, the S/E E/A hovered above them, affording a semblance of fighter cover. As soon as this maneuver was accomplished, the T/E E/A moved immediately to attack, with the enemy pilots holding their fire until well within range. When the first line of E/A was level with our A/C and began to fire, those flying above our formation began diving at about 45°, opening fire in the dive. Enemy pilots did not take evasive action in closing very slowly on the formation. Our crews report that when E/A were destroyed or knocked out of their formation, others would fill in their places immediately, indicating a well-coordinated effort to disperse the bomber formation by thoroughly spraying it with 20 mm. fire. Our crews estimate that enemy pilots closed to within 75 to 100 yards before breaking off their attack. Some would break off by passing above the bomber formation, while others dove below and to the side of the formation. Some enemy pilots appeared to hesitate at the moment of break-off and continued on through our formation, taking no evasive action. Some crews report that E/A passing over the formation opened fire with their remote control machine guns mounted on either side of the fuselage. These guns seemed to have little effect. Me 109s and FW 190s made half-hearted attacks from 6 to 7 o'clock by diving at our formation from above in pairs and breaking off their attacks at about 300 or 400 yards by split "S"-ing down and away. Our crews were very impressed with the slow speed of the enemy planes and lack of evasive action taken by enemy pilots. Most of the attacks against this group came from 6 o'clock level and high.

The 91st "A" group flying with the 1st "A" Combat Wing was attacked by 50 to 75 Me 410s at 0930 hours in the vicinity of Muritz Lake. This attack was made by the Me 410s in a mass group formation, with the E/A attacking the Fortresses in elements of two and three. All attacks were made from the 6 o'clock

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position, with some E/A coming in level and others diving down and attacking from underneath. The E/A passed through the 91st "A" formation, broke up, and continued the attack individually and in pairs from all angles and all positions around the clock. The attacks were especially vicious and continued for about twenty minutes to the Strausburg area. Me 410s were painted silver, and some were darkly camouflaged. Several crews reported S/E E/A attacking during this period. There was no unusual armament reported, but some crews commented on the shells from the Me 410s exploding in mid-air, leaving a grayish colored ball of smoke.

The 398th group supplied the lead and low boxes of the 1st "B" Combat Wing, and reports encountering no enemy fighters. Their crew members did observe attacks against the 1st "A" Combat Wing.

The 91st group supplied the high box of the 1st "B" Combat Wing and reports no E/A opposition.

The 94th "B" Combat Wing had its lead and low boxes supplied by the 457th group, and the high box was a composite made up of A/C from the 457th, 351st, and 401st groups. There were no E/A encountered by this Combat Wing, although some crews report a few, possibly E/A, but these were at such a great distance from the formation so as to preclude positive identification.

The 384th group supplied the lead and low boxes of the 41st "A" Combat Wing, and the high box was made up of A/C of the 384th and 379th groups making a composite group. There were no E/A attacks against this Combat Wing.

The 41st "B" Combat Wing was made up of lead and low boxes supplied by the 303rd group and a composite high box made up of A/C from the 303rd and 379th groups. Only eight crews of this Combat Wing report seeing E/A, ranging in numbers from six to 30, and seen between 0924 and 1004 hours just before the I.P. One crew reported from six to ten E/A seen during the bomb run, but these did not interfere with the bombers. There was still another report of ten E/A north of Berlin. One crew reported dog-fights in the target area between friendly and enemy fighters.

The 41st "C" Combat Wing was made up of the 379th group flying lead position, the 92nd group low, and the 401st group high. The 379th and 401st groups report no enemy fighters, while the 92nd group states that at 0945 hours two Ju 88s were seen in the Berlin area just before bombs away. This group also reports five unidentified E/A seen near the I.P. at 1010 hours which were dispersed by P-47s. Three Me 109s were seen just at "bombs away", but these were engaged by friendly fighters. Two Me 109s were seen over Wittenburg, and two Fw 190s were seen at 1023 hours over Berlin, but these were engaged by friendly fighters.

The 40th "A" Combat Wing was made up of A/C of the 306th group flying in lead, low and high positions. One attack on a straggler from this group was made by two S/E fighters from 6 o'clock high shortly before the target at 1018 hours. In the Hamburg area on the way out, a straggler from a different group was reported under attack by a pair of S/E fighters, but these were jumped by P-38s and dispersed.

The 305th group supplied the lead and low boxes of the 40th "B" Combat Wing, and the 92nd group supplied the high box. There were no E/A encounters reported by this Combat Wing.

I. WEATHER

England was under the influence of a high pressure area which broke at a weak cold front extending southwestward across Heligeland, the Zuider Zee and the Dutch Isles. Cloud cover consisted of 8 - 10/10 stratocumulus at 2 - 3000 feet with tops at 3 - 5000 feet over a six mile wide strip along the southern shore of the North Sea. The cloud broke to 3 - 5/10 over inland Germany and eastern France. The force going to bases in Russia encountered 10/10 towering cumulus at the Russe-Polish border, but this broke in the Peltava area.

Base weather conditions in England were complicated by a 10/10 layer of stratus with bases ranging from 500 - 900 feet and tops 25000 feet. Visibility was generally 3 - 5 miles but light drizzle limited the visibility to one mile at some bases. These conditions prevailed on both take-off and return.

II. STATISTICAL SUMMARYA. Targets

<u>Target</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Latitude</u>	<u>Longitude</u>
Berlin	City Area	5231N	1323E
Berlin/Niederscheneeweide	Tank Engine	5230N	1323E
Berlin/Marienfelde	Aero Engine	5226N	1323E
Basdorf	Aero Engine	5243N	1325E
Ruhland	Oil	5128N	1352E
Genshagen	Aero Engine	5219N	1316E

B. Our Task Forces

<u>Mission</u>	<u>Targets</u>	<u>Div</u>	<u>CW</u>	<u>Escort</u>		<u>Ftr Sweeps</u>		<u>Bombers</u>		<u>Fighters</u>			
				<u>Gps</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Gps</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Disp</u>	<u>Atkg</u>	<u>Disp</u>	<u>Serties</u>		
1.	Ruhland	3rd	2	2	P-47			147	113	72	67		
				2	P-51					122	108		
2.	Berlin	1st	9	2	P-47			491	456	86	68		
				2	P-38					109	100		
				2	P-51					73	65		
3.	Genshagen Marienfelde Niederscheneeweide	2nd	7	4	P-47			233	152	194	167		
				3	P-38					72	30	148	123
				3	P-51					62	54	118	86
4.	Berlin Basdorf	3rd	7	2	P-47			114	104	81	79		
				2	P-38					92	81	108	93
				2	P-51							91	63
<u>T/Os</u>								122					
<u>TOTALS</u>			25	26					1211	1112	1202	1019	

C. Enemy Forces1. Enemy Fighters

	<u>No of E/A</u>	<u>Type</u>	<u>Concentration</u>		
			<u>Area</u>	<u>Latitude</u>	<u>Longitude</u>
I.	40	s/e	Muritz See	5325N	1240E
	60	t/e			
II.	50	s/e	Magdeburg	5208N	1138E
	30	t/e			
III.	45	s/e	Brest-Litevsk		

Target	<u>No. of Guns</u>	<u>Intensity</u>	<u>Accuracy</u>
Berlin	} 3 2 2	Moderate/Intense	Accurate
Basdorf		Moderate/Intense	Accurate
Genshagen			
Ruhland	4	Meager	Inaccurate

#### D. Results

##### 1. Bombing

<u>Target</u>	<u>Reported Results</u>	<u>Time</u>	<u>Altitude</u>	<u>Tons</u>
Ruhland	Excellent	1030-1042	19000-21000	208.7
Berlin	Fair to Very Good	1006-1027	25000-29000	1278.8
Genshagen	Poor	1005-1013	21000-24000	378.9
Marienfelde	Unobserved	1017-1020	21400-24400	76.3
Niederschenweide	Fair to Good	1018	21000-22000	115.1
Basdorf	Good	1030-1055	23000-25000	185.1

##### 2. Claims

	<u>Destroyed</u>	<u>Probable</u>	<u>Damaged</u>	<u>Total</u>
Fighters - in the air	24	0	11	35
on the ground	2	0	4	6
Total Fighters	26	0	15	41
Total Bombers	17	16	57	90
Grand Total	43	16	72	131

##### 3. Losses

	<u>E/A</u>	<u>AA</u>	<u>N/E</u>	<u>OT</u>	<u>Total</u>
1st Division	5	6	0	5	16
2nd Division	8	7	3	2	20
3rd Division	0	3	2	6	11
Total Bombers	13	16	5	13	47
Total Fighters	1	1	0	2	4
Grand Total	14	17	5	15	51

### III. OUR PLAN OF ATTACK

Long preparations for the first shuttle raid to Russia had been made, and on this day the Commanding General, USSTAF, ordered it to take place. In conjunction with a large-scale effort on Berlin two combat wings were to bomb oil targets in Ruhland and continue to Russian bases.

In the main effort on targets in the Berlin area, the 1st Division B-17s were to depart from the English coast at Cramer, continue over the north Sea to Husum. They were to head between Hamburg and Kiel, continuing on a south-east coast until they reached the Oder River. There they were to swing sharply south to Berlin. Two combat wings from the 3rd Division followed substantially the same route. The withdrawal took them due northwest to Husum and from there a reciprocal course to the penetration course was flown.

The 2nd Division composed of seven combat wings was scheduled to depart from Lowestoft, head over the North Sea on a course roughly paralleling the 1st Division route, but somewhat to the south. Landfall was to occur at Cuxhaven; the course then broke southwest to Wittenberg. The B-24s were to

east and north to position themselves for an east-west run on Berlin aero-engine plants. Withdrawal was planned northwest to Ludwigslust, thence to Husum on the same withdrawal route as the 1st Division. Escort on this force, 10 fighter groups, was to give continuous close escort as were the 12 fighter groups of the 1st and 3rd Division forces.

The two Soviet-bound combat wings of B-17s were to depart behind the 2nd Division B-24s, following them to Wittenberg where they broke off to bomb the synthetic oil plant at Ruhland. With the 2nd Division shielding this penetration and the simultaneous penetrations of B-17s somewhat to the north, these groups would be effectively screened against enemy fighter attacks. The course after bombs away was virtually due east to the Polish-Russian border where the three combat wings turned southeast on the final phase of the route to USSTAF Eastern Command bases at Mirgorod and Peltava; two landing at the former and one at the latter. Two groups of P-47s furnished this force early penetration support and a P-51 group took them through the target to the Polish-German border. There a P-51 group was to relieve them and furnish escort to the limit of endurance. It was hoped that they would last to the Polish-Russian border, leaving there for the USSTAF Eastern Command base at Piryatín.

#### IV. THE ENEMY SITUATION

The intensity of the ground battle in Normandy mounted daily, and as on the previous day the Hun's fighter force was in the process of making some semblance of a defensive effort in France. He was, therefore, still dependent on his t/e and s/e night fighters. The actual numerical figures in the strategic areas remained unchanged from the previous day; the serviceability figure probably fell downward owing to the reactions of those engagements.

Unhampered by weather and faced with a two pronged attack, the enemy pursued his avowed policy of allowing no deep thrust to go unchallenged. By the time the leading elements of the 1st Division made landfall, s/e from Lippspringe and Gutersloh were proceeding to Muritz See, and t/e were collecting in the Stettin area preparatory to augmenting the Muritz See assembly. Some 40 s/e and 60 t/e later appeared in that area, at Magdeburg another assembly was underway, some 50 s/e and 30 t/e convening there. No coordinated opposition arose on the surprise thrust across Poland to Russia, but scattered elements hastily arose in the Warsaw-Brest-Litovsk sectors to make ineffectual jabs.

#### V. THE AIR BATTLE

The double-thrust over the Reich's northern perimeter somewhat concealed our intentions, and it wasn't until spearheads of the 1st Division drew abreast of Schaal Lake that the Muritz See assembly was completed. The enemy was aware of the fact that the lengthening column of the 1st Division produced gaps in the escort, but chose to wait until he achieved a stronger concentration before exploiting any openings. Shuttling back to Stettin, the enemy inadvertently gained temporary fighter superiority, for half of the escort of the 1st Division had made rendezvous with the Russian-bound forces further south. Near Pasewalk, the 1st Division column was now seventy miles long and protected by only one group of P-51s. Quickly grabbing this opening, the enemy diverted the escort with 25 of his s/e and charged into the bombers with 60 t/e, supported by a top cover of 15 Me-109s. He destroyed 6 bombers in this fray, with little interference from the P-51s. By the time the errant P-51s realized their mistake and returned to their briefed wards, the enemy force had vanished.

The Second Division meanwhile was engaged by the force drawn from the south that had apparently assembled somewhere near Magdeburg. The twins in this gathering never made contact with the bombers, for the escort chased them away. Some of the s/e did break the cordon of escort by making single-harassing attacks and did knock down seven B-24s by pecking at them from Dahme to the target. Withdrawal by all forces to the UK was unopposed.

After carefully planning a reception committee in the Berlin area for the

21 June 1944

expected westerly withdrawal of the Ruhland force, the Luftwaffe, to their great surprise, watched the B-17s disappear to the east and out of reach. A hasty attempt at interception was effected 50 miles southeast of Brest-Litovsk by some 20 - 30 s/e. In a simultaneous attack against the leading and trailing elements of the force, the enemy got nowhere. The escorting P-51s clubbed them for claims of 6-0-3 for the loss of one fighter, and the bombers claimed 2-1-0 against no losses of their own.

## VI. SUMMARY OF MISSION

### A. Success of Our Plan

In the Berlin effort, the escort snafu was rather costly. From all causes, the bombers suffered a rather severe loss, the final count placing some 47 bombers in the MIA category. The bombing itself was below the usual Eighth Air Force standards.

Although the bombing results at Ruhland were excellent, a subsequent misfortune partly nullified that strategic success as well as the immeasurable political and morale building effects. An enemy air attack on the night of 21 June destroyed 47 of the 73 a/c which landed at Peltava and severely damaged most of the remainder. For almost two hours, 75 bombers attacked the base, exhibiting a very high degree of accuracy; some estimates claim 98% of bombs fell on either the flying field and line installations or in dispersal areas.

HEADQUARTERS 306TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)  
Office of the Materiel Officer  
United States ForcesAPO 557,  
21 June, 1944,

SUBJECT: S-4 Combat Mission Report on Mission of 21 June 1944.

TO : Group Operations Officer, 306th Bombardment Group (H), APO 557.

1. The following aircraft were abortive due to reasons listed:

- (1) B-17G 42-31418 - 423rd Squadron - returned early. Pilot reported oil pressure on No. 4 engine dropped to 55 lbs. and that black smoke and oil was coming out of breather. On ground check, steel filings were found on magnetic sump plug and pieces of rings and filings were found in the cuno. Engine had 281:55 hours on it prior to this flight. (Materiel Failure). (Piloted by Weiland)
- (2) B-17G 42-38198 - (369th A/C flown by 423rd) - returned early. Pilot reported No. 1 and 2 generators oscillating slightly and No. 4 generator oscillating up to 90 amps. No. 1, 2 and 3 superchargers ran up to 50" Hg., upon getting over 36" manifold pressure on No. 4. No. 4 supercharger would only put out 30" manifold pressure at over 10,00 ft. altitude with normal manifold pressure on No. 1, 2 and 3. Generator voltage regulators checked on test stand at 449th Sub-Depot Electrical Shop and very slight surge noted on No. 1, 2 and 3 generator voltage regulators. No. 4 generator voltage regulator found to be defective and to have a surge of as much as 90 amps. Rust found on the Potentiometer of No. 4 supercharger governor, causing low manifold pressure on No. 4 supercharger. No. 1, 2 and 3 superchargers running up to 50" Hg. caused by pilot having the control setting on No. 10 setting instead of No. 8 setting. (Materiel Failure) (Piloted by Arrison).

It is the belief of this office that the following malfunctions were present:

1. Faulty adjustment on voltage regulator (No. 4). This generator should have been switched off in flight.
2. Malfunction of No. 4 supercharger governor - the other manifold pressures acted perfectly normal, according to the pilot's narrative.

2. The following is a summary of battle damages incurred:

Total Damaged - 26    Severe - 16    Slight - 10

Flak - 26    Missing - 0

3. (See attached page for fuel consumption report).

*James M. Venable, Jr.*  
JAMES M. VENABLE, JR.  
Captain, Air Corps,  
Material Officer.

HEADQUARTERS 306TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)  
Office of the Operations Officer

E-A-7

AFO 557,  
21 June, 1944.

SUBJECT: Fuel Consumption Report - Mission of 21 June 1944 - Berlin, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 306th Bombardment Group (H), AFO 557.

1. Gallonage and Flight Time

<u>A/C No. &amp; Type</u>	<u>Gallons</u>	<u>Flight Time</u>
<u>40th "A" Lead</u>		
B17G 42-102578	2500	8:51
B17G 42-31726	2450	9:07
B17G 42-97278	2635	9:12
B17G 42-97368	Damaged. Not Refueled.	9:27
B17G 42-97323	Damaged. Not Refueled.	9:08
B17G 42-38093	Damaged. Not Refueled.	8:53
B17G 42-38155	Damaged. Not Refueled.	8:49
B17G 43-37575	2390	8:45
B17G 44-6087	2480	8:46
B17G 42-37943	2225	9:39
B17G 42-97327	2380	8:38
B17G 42-97946	2370	8:34
B17G 42-102619	2200	7:53
B17G 42-37836	2310	8:46
B17G 42-38148	2480	3:53
B17G 42-31690	2350	8:50
B17G 42-102512	Landed at Rackheath.	

40th "A" High

B17G 42-102969	Damaged. Not Refueled.	9:21
B17G 42-32099	Damaged. Not Refueled.	9:11
B17G 42-37600	Landed at Rackheath.	
B17G 42-38129	Damaged. Not Refueled.	8:48
B17G 42-102557	Damaged. Not Refueled.	9:34
B17G 42-102558	2340	9:09
B17G 42-97185	2500	9:40
B17G 42-97297	2630	8:27
B17G 42-107153	2730	9:30
B17G 42-37619	Damaged. Not Refueled.	9:11
B17G 42-97301	2450	9:16
B17G 42-102669	2780	9:20

40th "A" High

<u>A/C No. &amp; Type</u>	<u>Gallons</u>	<u>Flight Time</u>
B17G 42-97365	2555	9:16
B17G 42-102975	2565	8:48
B17G 43-37693	2550	8:46
B17G 42-97896	Refueled at Bristern.	
B17G 42-97376	2550	9:11
B17G 42-107086	Damaged. Not Refueled.	8:59

40th "A" Low

B17G 42-102547	2470	9:11
B17G 42-97133	2300	8:57
B17G 42-37840	2450	8:03
B17G 43-37715	2385	8:12
B17G 42-107063	2610	8:25
B17G 42-38042	2680	8:16
B17G 42-30939	2425	9:17
B17G 42-31737	2510	6:41
B17G 43-37549	2390	9:11
B17G 44-6012	Damaged. Not Refueled.	8:36
B17G 42-39963	2450	9:08
B17G 42-97505	2430	9:03
B17G 42-97180	2450	8:33
B17G 43-37616	Refueled at Oakley.	
B17G 43-37598	2465	8:49
B17G 42-107055	2415	9:03

2. All tanks topped after pre-flight.

*Toy B. Husband*  
TOY B. HUSBAND,  
Major, AC,  
Operations Officer.

HEADQUARTERS 306TH BOMBARDMENT GROUP (H)  
Office of the Group Bombardier

A.P.O. 557,  
21 June 1944.

SUBJECT: Bombing Narrative Report.

TO : Commanding Officer, 306th Bombardment Group (H), APO 557.

40th "A" Lead

1. The 306th furnished 17 A/C to fly the lead group of the 40th "A" Combat Wing. One PFF A/C was used. I.P. was clear but contrails obscured target. Lead bombardier made run on built up area east of A.P. when a break in contrails appeared. Visibility good except for heavy contrails. One A/C dropped bombs on target of opportunity. One A/C carried nickels.
2. Difficulties encountered.
  - a. 10/10ths contrails.
  - b. A/C # 619 released bombs early to stay in formation at 5340-1150.
3. All A/C bombed.
4. Bombing results were unobserved.
5. Complete Combat Bombing Flight Record enclosed.
6. Bombing accountability by number and type.
  - a. Total bombs carried: 128x500M-64 plus 2 smoke  
34x500M-17IB & 8x500M-43
  - b. Total bombs released on target: 120x500M-64 plus 2 smoke  
32x500M-17IB & 8x500M-43
  - c. Total bombs in A/C returned: None
  - d. Total bombs jettisoned from A/C returned: None
  - e. Total bombs in A/C attacking returned due to bombing equipment malfunction or weather: None
  - f. Total bombs jettisoned from A/C due to malfunction or weather: 8x500M-64 & 2x500M-17IB T.O.
  - g. Total bombs unaccounted for due to lost A/C: None
7. AFCE was not used because of weather.

40th "A" High

1. The 306th furnished 18 A/C to fly the high group of the 40th "A" Combat Wing. I.P. was clear but contrails developed and the group was split up. All A/C then dropped on flares previously released by groups ahead. Visibility good except for contrails.

2. Difficulties encountered.
  - a. 10/10ths contrails.
3. All A/C bombed.
4. Bombing results were not seen.
5. Complete Combat Bombing Flight Record enclosed.
6. Bombing accountability by number and type.
  - a. Total bombs carried: 136x500M-64 plus 1 smoke  
36x500M-17IB & 3x500M-43
  - b. Total bombs released on target: 136x500M-64 plus 1 smoke  
36x500M-17IB & 3x500M-43
  - c. Total bombs in A/C returned: None
  - d. Total bombs jettisoned from A/C returned: None
  - e. Total bombs in A/C attacking returned due to bombing equipment malfunction or weather: None
  - f. Total bombs jettisoned from A/C due to malfunction or weather: None
  - g. Total bombs unaccounted for due to lost A/C: None
7. AFCE was used.


40th "A" Low

1. The 306th group furnished 18 A/C to fly low group of the 40th "A" Combat Wing. I.P. was picked O.K. Heavy contrails were observed and group passed through them. The briefed A.P. was not observed but during a break in contrails lead bombardier aimed at a built up area east of briefed A.P. Visibility good except for contrails at bombing altitude. Two A/C dropped bombs on targets of opportunity.
2. Difficulties encountered.
  - a. 10/10ths contrails.
  - b. A/C # 737 returned to base early dropped bombs at 5432-0259.
  - c. A/C # 715 in order to stay with formation dropped bombs at 5340 - 1333.
3. A/C failing to bomb.
  - a. A/C # 418 returned to base early 8x500M-64 & 2x500M-17IB.
  - b. A/C # 198 returned to base early 8x500M-64 & 2x500M-17IB.
4. Bombing results were unobserved.
5. Complete Combat Bombing Flight Record enclosed.
6. Bombing accountability by number and type.

40TH CEW "A" L (H)  
306th Bombardment Gr (H)  
Formation at Assembly

21 June, 1944.

FORMATION DIAGRAM



\* Abortive  
O Position not flown this mission  
X Missing

21 June 1944

MEMORANDUM

TO CHIEF OF STAFF - EIGHTH AIR FORCE

STRIKE MESSAGES (Oper. 428 - F.O. 778)  
(1120 hours)

<u>1st B/Division:</u>	<u>Combat Wing</u>	<u>Group</u>	<u>Target</u>	<u>Method</u>	<u>Results</u>	<u>Time</u>
	94-A	All	Primary BERLIN - Center of City	VISUAL	GOOD	1006
	1-A		Primary BERLIN - C. of C.	VISUAL	EXCELL.	1011
	40-A		Primary BERLIN- C.of C.	BLIND	UNOBS.	1021
	40-B		Primary BERLIN C.of C.	BLIND	UNOBS.	1025
	41-C		Primary BERLIN C. of C.	BLIND	UNOBS.	1018
	41-A		Secondary BERLIN C. of C.	BLIND	UNOBS.	1019
<u>2nd B/Division:</u>	20-B	93rd	Primary BERLIN - Aero Engine Works	VISUAL	UNOBS.	1011
	2-B	453rd	Primary BERLIN Tank Engine Works	VISUAL	GOOD	1030
	20-B	448	Secondary BERLIN C. of City	PFF	UNOBS.	1017

**SECRET**

APO 557,  
21 June, 1944.

SUBJECT: Report of Aircraft Not Attacking - Mission of 21 June 1944 - Berlin, Germany.

TO : Commanding Officer, 306th Bombardment Group (W), APO 557.

AIRCRAFT NOT ATTACKING

40th "A" Lead

Mission of 21 June 1944

a.	Number of A/C Taking Off. . . . .	17
b.	A/C Taking Off Less Unused Spares . . . . .	17
c.	Number of A/C Attacking . . . . .	17
d.	Number of A/C Not Attacking . . . . .	0

Note: One A/C bombed T/O at 5340N x 1150E.

40th "A" Lead (PFF - 305th Group)

Mission of 21 June 1944

a.	Number of A/C Taking Off. . . . .	.1
b.	A/C Taking Off Less Unused Spares . . . . .	.1
c.	Number of A/C Attacking . . . . .	.1
d.	Number of A/C Not Attacking . . . . .	.0

40th "A" High

Mission of 21 June 1944

a.	Number of A/C Taking Off. . . . .	18
b.	A/C Taking Off Less Unused Spares . . . . .	18
c.	Number of A/C Attacking . . . . .	18
d.	Number of A/C Not Attacking . . . . .	0

40th "A" Low

Mission of 21 June 1944

a.	Number of A/C Taking Off. . . . .	18
b.	A/C Taking Off Less Unused Spares . . . . .	18
c.	Number of A/C Attacking . . . . .	16
d.	Number of A/C Not Attacking . . . . .	2

e. Detailed description of reasons why A/C did not attack, as follows:

A/C 42-31418 Not a sortie. Returned early because of:  
 (a) Oil pressure on No. 4 engine dropped to 55 lbs.  
 (b) Steel filings were found on magnetic sump plug and in the cuno. Engine had 281:55 on it prior to this flight.

A/C 42-38198 Not a sortie. Returned early because of:  
 (a) Faulty adjustment on No. 4 voltage regulator caused oscillating of regulator.  
 (b) No. 4 supercharger out.  
 (c) Malfunction caused by failure of No. 4 supercharger governor.

Note: Two A/C bombed T/O's at 5432N x 0958E, and 5340N x 1333E.

*Floyd B. Husband*  
 FLOYD B. HUSBAND,  
 Major, AC,

Number 42-97896  
 Total time for  
 complete mission 11:20

O (P) Ralstin, E. L. 2nd. Lt.  
 O (CP) Jones, R. L. "  
 O (N) Locke, R. T. "  
 O (B) Meersman, T. J. "  
 O (E) Howard, W. M. T/Sgt.  
 O (R) Wrightman, G. W. Sgt.  
 O (G) Richardson, L. A. T/Sgt.  
 O (G) Simonian, S. Sgt.  
 O (G) Lloyd, L. "  
 (G) \_\_\_\_\_  
 ( ) \_\_\_\_\_

A/C Number 42-102669  
 Total time for  
 complete mission 10:15

O (P) Kata, A. P. F/O  
 O (CP) Newsom, Y. B. 2nd. Lt.  
 O (N) Bloker, R. E. "  
 O ( ) Esper, D. A. "  
 O ( ) Spry, R. C. T/Sgt.  
 O (O) Endrusick, S. A. "  
 O ( ) Latta, C. E. S/Sgt.  
 O (G) Kepler, H. F. "  
 O (C) Lowry, B. F. "  
 (G) \_\_\_\_\_  
 ( ) \_\_\_\_\_

A/C Number 42-102975  
 Total time for  
 Complete mission 9:35

O (P) Bennett, F. H. 2nd. Lt.  
 O (CP) Mullencaux, E. V. "  
 O (N) Mier, D. W. "  
 O (B) Borchardt, D. F. "  
 O (E) Kasburg, A. H. T/Sgt.  
 O (RO) Westhues, J. H. "  
 O (G) Iacarnso, J. V. S/Sgt.  
 O (G) Chadakoff, N. "  
 O (G) Smith, A. L. "  
 (G) \_\_\_\_\_  
 ( ) \_\_\_\_\_

A/C Number 42-107086  
 Total time for  
 Complete mission 9:40

O (P) Gribovica, W. J. 2nd. Lt.  
 O (CP) Shoop, E. F. "  
 O (N) Soifer, S. "  
 O (B) Schwet, J. G. "  
 O (E) Irwin, R. N. T/Sgt.  
 O (RO) King, G. J. "  
 O (G) Bennett, B. F. S/Sgt.  
 O (G) Tolmachoff, A. H. "  
 O (G) Yager, W. H. "  
 (G) \_\_\_\_\_  
 ( ) \_\_\_\_\_

SQUADRON 368th

MISSION NUMBER 183

DATE June 21, 1944

A/C Number 42-102512

Total time for complete mission 9:45

- O (P) 2nd Lt. Niblack, C.T.
- O (CP) 2nd Lt. Drmgardner, D.E.
- O (N) 2nd Lt. Lewandowski, R.L.
- O (B) 2nd Lt. Borgert, R.L.
- O (E) S/Sgt. Brock, R.O.
- O (R) S/Sgt. Combs, R.F.
- O (G) Sgt. Estermyer, R.J.
- O (G) Sgt. Lockard, E.J.
- O (G) Sgt. Wilson, R.M.
- (G)
- ( )

A/C Number 42-31590

Total time for complete mission 9:45

- O (P) 1st Lt. Nash, W.M.
- O (CP) 2nd Lt. Markle, W.D.
- O (N) 2nd Lt. Chee, H.T.
- O (B) 2nd Lt. Banta, R.E.
- O (E) S/Sgt. Kelly, I.W.
- O (R) T/Sgt. Lane, C.E.
- O (G) S/Sgt. Benningfield, W.L.
- O (G) Sgt. Yeats, M.F.
- O (C) Sgt. Heller, B.
- (G)
- ( )

A/C Number 42-37836

Total time for Complete mission 9:40

- O (P) 2nd Lt. Erwin, W.H.
- O (CP) 1st Lt. Johnson, C.A.
- O (N) 2nd Lt. O'Konski, A.
- O (B) 2nd Lt. Snead, P.
- O (E) T/Sgt. Perkins, R.L.
- O (RO) T/Sgt. Church, R.N.
- O (G) Sgt. Revolti, D.E.
- O (G) Sgt. Schultz, A.C.
- O (G) S/Sgt. Immermann, M.B.
- (G)
- ( )

A/C Number 44-6087

Total time for Complete mission 9:45

- O (P) 1st Lt. Trigg, C.L.
- O (CP) 1st Lt. Weinel, G.A.
- O (N) 2nd Lt. Tomasella, P.A.
- O (B) 1st Lt. Eldredge, P.D.
- O (E) T/Sgt. Novak, J.B.
- O (RO) T/Sgt. Morrow, P.S.
- O (G) Sgt. Horste, R.M.
- O (G) S/Sgt. Foster, G.B.
- O (G) S/Sgt. Brunette, E.H.
- (G)
- ( )

SQUADRON 368th

MISSION NUMBER 183

DATE June 21, 1944

RECEIVED

C. Number 42-38155

A/C Number 42-97368

Total time for complete mission 9:35

Total time for complete mission 10:30

- (P) 1st Lt. Boswell, G.A.
- (CP) 2nd Lt. Scolnik, R.J.
- (N) 2nd Lt. Gumberledge, T.C.
- (B) 2nd Lt. Burnett, A.F.
- (E) S/Sgt. Sharp, B.D.
- (R) T/Sgt. Ruschmyer, D.F.
- (G) S/Sgt. Copp, P.R.
- (G) S/Sgt. Cook, O.L.
- (G) Sgt. Ficklin, R.C.
- (G)
- ( )

- (P) Capt. Rehn, A.F.
- (CP) 1st Lt. Mitchell, W.G.
- (N) 1st Lt. Buchanan, P.E.
- ( ) 1st Lt. Carsten, P.R.
- ( ) T/Sgt. Borchers, J.R.
- (G) T/Sgt. Ewing, E.D.
- ( ) S/Sgt. Wilton, R.W.
- (G) S/Sgt. Adkins, J.K.
- (C) S/Sgt. Hopkins, C.L.
- (G)
- ( )

A/C Number 43-37575

A/C Number 42-38143

Total time for Complete mission 9:40

Total time for Complete mission 9:50

- (P) 2nd Lt. Patton, E.R.
- (CP) 2nd Lt. Hoisington, O.H.
- (N) 2nd Lt. Telkamp, E.A.
- (B) 1st Lt. Seed, J.D.
- (E) Sgt. Wells, J.W.
- (RO) S/Sgt. Plantz, W.F.
- (G) Sgt. Blake, R.C.
- (G) Sgt. Texter, L.
- (G) Sgt. Teckman, T.J.
- (G)
- ( )

- (P) 2nd Lt. Allen, D.C.
- (CP) 2nd Lt. Rapp, C.V.
- (N) 2nd Lt. Donahue, C.
- (B) 2nd Lt. Vlahos, M.L.
- (E) Sgt. Purkey, H.J.
- (RO) Sgt. Newsbigle, R.
- (G) Sgt. Huebotter, R.C.
- (G) Sgt. LeVeque, E.W.
- (G) Sgt. Carey, J.R.
- (G)
- ( )

SQUADRON 367th

MISSION NUMBER 183

DATE 21 June 1944

A/C Number 43-37600

Total time for complete mission 9:15

A/C Number

Total time for complete mission

- O (P) ADAM, M.M. 2nd Lt.
- O (CP) PRESCOTT, H.L. 2nd Lt.
- O (N) STRONG, R.A. 2nd Lt.
- O (B) VANN, A. 2nd Lt.
- O (E) Ferrari, P.M. S/Sgt.
- O (R) Conger, R.W. Sgt.
- O (G) Pluta, J.S. Sgt.
- O (G) Skiver, J.E. Pvt.
- O (G) Prior, R.J.H. Sgt.
- (G)
- ( )

- (P)
- (CP)
- (N)
- (B)
- (E)
- (R)
- (G)
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- (G)
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A/C Number  
Total time for Complete mission

A/C Number  
Total time for Complete mission

- (P)
- (CP)
- (N)
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